The idiosyncrasies surrounding these coups have sparked debate in the academic arena, as researchers seek to understand the logic and drive behind the upsurge. Asadu argues that the popular support received by many of these coups indicate plagued political systems, stagnant economic growth, and deteriorated standards of living, but more significantly failing democracies and a collapsed rule of law in many of these African states. – Picture: Albert Gonzalez Farran / UNAMID
By Ndzalama Mathebula
In recent years the African Continent, particularly West and Central Africa, has been experiencing an upsurge of coups and undemocratic means of seizing power. Namely Mali in August 2020, Chad in April 2021, Guinea in September 2021, Burkina Faso in January 2022, Niger in July 2023 and Gabon in August 2023.
The idiosyncrasies surrounding these coups have sparked debate in the academic arena, as researchers seek to understand the logic and drive behind the upsurge. The pattern of these coups suggests the possibility of a coup contagion, something Singh rebukes.
Naunihal Singh, in his article The Myth of the Coup Contagion argues that there is no evidence of a contagious wave, but rather what is being witnessed is a contemporaneous effect of previously coup-prone states in West and Central Africa. Chinedu Asadu argues that the popular support received by many of these coups indicate plagued political systems, stagnant economic growth, and deteriorated standards of living, but more significantly failing democracies and a collapsed rule of law in many of these African states.
As these democracies fail to bring forth change, numerous African states have succumbed to the forceful removal of presidents and seizure of power. This piece seeks to focus on coup leaders and their military force, their psychological framing, cognitive bias, and how they choose to respond to what they perceive as a risk. In this regard, risk will be defined as the loss of sovereignty within the coup circle.
Tenets of political risk discuss how the myriad nexuses between the psychology of risk, risk aversion, repression, and civil-military relations explain the nature of the resurgence in coup in African states.
Moderan and Kone note that the upsurge of coups in West Africa mirrors the challenges of their political systems that continuously fail to meet democratic expectations and are plagued by corruption.
The argument is led by what Asher terms the psychology of risk, which defines the mental processing individuals undertake in perceiving, evaluating, and responding to risks. A key aspect presented here is that individuals do not always make rational or objective decisions when faced with assessing risks and uncertainty.
Herein, cognitive bias and perception bias, which is the brain’s tendency to simplify information processing through a filter preference and personal experiences becomes significant.
When discussing the resurgence of coups in Africa, the idea of repression and risk aversion emerges. Due to the unstable and ungovernable nature of coup governments, the fashion in which power is attained is the same way in which it should be maintained. Which unfortunately increases the risk of repression in the country. This creates a highly militarised state yet a very susceptible state for future coups to take place.
The change of leadership precipitated by coups which lead to countrywide celebrations indicates a political system so discredited and plagued by deficiencies that it is at a point where it has lost its legitimacy
The change of leadership precipitated by coups which lead to countrywide celebrations indicates a political system so discredited and plagued by deficiencies that it is at a point where it has lost its legitimacy.
Unfortunately, this type of transfer of leadership barely brings forth any change. Rather it leads to a civil-military problematique, as coined by Peter Fever, who argues that armed forces with the means to defend their state invariably have the means to attack it as well.
This means that armed forces that can put a coup leader in power also have the means to overthrow them which heightens the level of paranoia and uncertainty amongst coup leaders, key military personnel, and the military selectorate.
Herein, the individuals involved in the coup are constantly bedevilled by some perception of bias that enables them to consider one another rivals who could unleash a preventive strike as a form of protection and a measure of risk aversion.
The dilemma for these military leaders stems from choosing either to be repressed by those in power or repressing the whole nation as a way of staying in power and ensuring that they are not overthrown.
Many military leaders would rather opt for a preventive strike and repress the whole nation. Due to this security dilemma, countless coup leaders are repeatedly ousted by their military, who do not pursue a change of leadership in the interest of the whole nation but as a means to power.
This can be perceived as a preventive strike to diminish an enemy’s ability before they can attack. This indicates some form of psychological framing and risk aversion on how individuals choose to perceive and respond to risks.
Many military leaders would rather opt for a preventive strike and repress the whole nation. Due to this security dilemma, countless coup leaders are repeatedly ousted by their military, who do not pursue a change of leadership in the interest of the whole nation but as a means to power.
The 2020 Mali coup serves as an example of the argument presented above. Assimi Goita cited widespread popular dissatisfaction towards those in power when he removed them from power.
However, less than a year later in May 2021, he carried out a coup overthrowing the same transitional government that he helped establish. Simultaneously, he called for a cabinet reshuffle that excluded two key military leaders from his selectorate. The president of France, Emmanuel Macron referred to this as ‘a coup within a coup’.
When analysing these coup trends using the canons of the psychology of risk, we might ascertain how the hostile setting established by coups inevitably leads to repression. Firstly, Assimi overthrew the transitional government he helped establish, but did so not in the interest of development and improved governance in Mali.
Rather the abrupt change in leadership was prompted by an individual psychological framing and cognitive bias of responding to what he perceived as a risk, and as such he opted to be the repressor rather than being repressed.
Secondly, as a risk aversion measure and a preventive strike, he excluded two key leaders who signalled a civil-military problematique to Assimi. They demonstrated the potential to overthrow him, just as he overthrew the prior transitional government.
The uncoordinated nature of coups regrettably lowers the bar of leadership change while encouraging insurgent behaviour. Thus, for military leaders to maintain order and keep power they must engage in the repression of the whole society; deeming the whole concept of leadership change futile for the actual development of these countries.
Ndzalama Mathebula is an Assistant Lecturer at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, and a PhD candidate at the Wits School of Governance.
This article was first published on ACCORD
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