Three years in the trenches: From ‘Russia’s losing’ to ‘Ukraine is done for’?

Exactly three years ago, Russian troops entered Ukraine with the aim of forcing Kiev to halt military attacks on the Donbass republics, to ensure its own security, and dismantling a regime that fostered the growth of neo-Nazism in the country. Due to the West’s support for its proxies in Kiev, the conflict has dragged on, and Russia’s military operation has reshaped perceptions of what a modern armed conflict between two large armies – each with its own strengths and weaknesses – should look like. 

Here we revisit the events of the past three years, reflecting on the significant developments along the front lines.

February – March 2022: Shock and awe, or there and back again

Russia’s military operation started in the early hours of February 24, 2022. Troops were deployed to Ukraine from seven main directions: towards Kiev along the right bank of the Dnieper River; towards Chernigov; Sumy; Kharkov; and the north of the Lugansk People’s Republic; and from Crimea via two routes: one via Perekop towards Kherson and the Kakhovka Dam, and another through Chongar towards Melitopol. Landing forces were also deployed – amphibious forces landed on Snake Island in the Black Sea and airborne forces landed at Gostomel Airport near Kiev.

At the same time, massive missile strikes struck pre-identified targets all over Ukraine: air defenses were suppressed, communication nodes were disabled, fortified command posts, weapons depots, fuel storage facilities, and oil refineries were destroyed. One missile even struck the call center of Ukraine’s Center for Information and Psychological Operations near Kiev.

The militias of the then-newly-recognised Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) also actively fought. LPR militia advanced north, capturing territory alongside Russian forces, while DPR forces moved west from the Sea of Azov to Volnovakha, in the direction of the Russian army. By March 2, through their joint efforts, the city of Mariupol had been encircled.

However, the primary mission assigned to the LPR and DPR militia units was to engage and neutralise the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) along the most heavily fortified section of the line of demarcation (what had essentially been the border between the DPR and Ukraine since 2015) which stretched from Toretsk through Donetsk and to Ugledar.

Overall, the task was achieved: the Ukrainian command struggled to maneuver the main forces of the AFU and, with a few exceptions, offered little resistance during the first two weeks of the fighting.

Among the exceptions were Kharkov (it remains unclear if there were plans to capture the city in the early days of the operation, but Russian forces left after brief street battles) and the area to the west of Kiev, particularly the triangle formed by Gostomel, Bucha, and Irpin. The Russian command did not intend to seize Kiev; the group in Gostomel aimed to block the city from the west. Due to indiscriminate Ukrainian artillery fire, many civilians lost their lives in Bucha (a fact that the Ukrainian side later attributed to the Russian army). In Gostomel, a Ukrainian missile strike destroyed the An-225 Mriya, the world’s largest cargo plane.

The successful operations of the Russian Armed Forces included the capture of the Kakhovka Dam and the bridge over the Dnieper River in Kherson on February 24. Following that, Russian forces advanced north. Passing through Kherson without entering Nikolaev, the columns halted and eventually turned back a short distance from the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant.

In addition to Kherson, the southern areas of Kherson Region and Zaporozhye Region as well as the city of Melitopol and the port of Berdiansk were occupied during the first week. On March 3, as part of a swift and nearly bloodless operation, the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant came under Russian control, and the city of Energodar was captured without a battle.

During this period, the Russian army acted in a highly maneuverable and dispersed manner. Aside from the Donbass, there was virtually no front line; as military columns advanced, they often left only isolated checkpoints behind them, or even unmonitored territory. 

For example, Russian forces didn’t enter the city of Chernigov, opting instead to pass through Sumy several times. The roads were under the nominal control of the Russian army, but it wasn’t consistent.

This situation couldn’t last long. By early March, Russian forces in northern Ukraine began to suffer significant losses due to semi-partisan attacks launched by territorial defense units and hastily assembled reserves of the AFU. Using light armored vehicles and often simple civilian cars, they systematically targeted Russian supply columns.

After the failed negotiations in Istanbul, Russian troops were withdrawn from Kiev as well as Chernigov and Sumy regions. They were redeployed to Kharkov and Donbass to bolster combat formations and create a front line. This was done in the first days of April 2022.

April - October 2022: ‘Swiss cheese’ instead of a front

Lacking the ability to advance along the entire front, the Russian army switched to defense in most areas. Intense fighting erupted in the spring over the besieged city of Mariupol, which housed a garrison of 20,000 Ukrainian troops; half of them were part of the neo-Nazi Azov regiment that had controlled the city since 2014. The battles reduced Mariupol to rubble, and culminated in the complete destruction of the nationalists’ last stronghold – the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works. By May 20, the garrison at the steel works surrendered, and over 2,000 neo-Nazis were taken prisoner. The battles in the city were over.

Due to a shortage of personnel, the Russian military leadership was forced to improvise. The front sector north of Donetsk was handed over to PMC Wagner, whose leader, Evgeny Prigozhin, began recruiting volunteers, including convicts. At its peak, PMC Wagner boasted around 20,000 fighters, and during the spring and summer of 2022, they successfully stormed Popasnaya, Svetlodarsk, and the Uglegorsk power station, and participated in battles for the cities of Lisichansk and Severodonetsk.

During the same period, the Russian army found itself in a precarious situation: mobilisation efforts were ramped up in Ukraine, and the number of servicemen in the AFU grew dramatically. By fall, estimates suggested that the Ukrainian army was two or three times as large as Russia’s (approximately 500,000-600,000 servicemen compared to Russia’s 180,000-200,000 people).

This lack of troops prevented Russian forces from establishing a solid front line, as prescribed by military doctrine, and defense remained patchy in several areas, particularly in northern Kharkov. It was there, in September, that the AFU launched its most successful operation.

With Russian forces largely concentrated in populated areas, the AFU exploited light armored vehicles and even regular civilian cars to penetrate deep behind enemy lines. Without engaging in direct combat, they quickly took control of vast territories, forcing Russian garrisons to flee to avoid encirclement.

In just a few days, the AFU advanced 70-80km along a front stretching 130km, capturing the towns of Izium, Kupiansk, Liman, and Vovchansk. The AFU employed its tactical advantages – reconnaissance, effective communication, and a significant numerical superiority (up to eight times greater in the direction of the main assaults) – to the fullest.

The Ukrainian offensive near Kherson did not unfold as successfully. Throughout the spring and summer, the Ukrainian army struggled to advance toward Kherson along the road to Nikolaev and attempted to cross the Ingulets River, which had become an improvised frontline to the northwest of the regional center.

During the summer, NATO began supplying the AFU with artillery, particularly Western HIMARS rocket systems, which proved most effective in Kherson region. The supply line for the Russian forces in Kherson relied heavily on two crossings: the Antonovsky automobile bridge and the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station dam. Both were subjected to daily missile strikes, and over time, the bridge became completely unusable (two pontoons were set up), while the dam operated intermittently as a crossing point.

As a result, by late October 2022, the Russian command made the “difficult decision” to fully withdraw from the right bank of the Dnieper River, including the city of Kherson. The Russian forces faced personnel shortages and significant supply challenges.

After the terrorist attack on the Crimean Bridge and amid the looming threat of a Ukrainian breakthrough toward the Sea of Azov, in September and October 2022 Russia announced partial mobilisation, calling up 300,000 troops. This was undoubtedly one of the most challenging periods for Russia.

November 2022 - October 2023: Bakhmut, Ukraine’s counteroffensive, and a turning point at the front

The partial mobilisation and urgent military reforms allowed Russia to stabilise the front, leading to a relatively quiet period during the winter and spring. The only hotspot (but an intense one) was Artemovsk (called Bakhmut in Ukraine), where the bloodiest battles raged, earning it the grim nickname of “the Bakhmut meat grinder.”

The main forces that operated here were Prigozhin’s PMC Wagner. By mid-January 2023, they captured the important city of Soledar after which battles for Artemovsk (Bakhmut) began. 

Artemovsk became the site of the first urban battles, and set the stage for many other such battles across Donbass. Initially, Artemovsk was surrounded on three sides, and Russian forces established fire control over the main roads leading into the city. This paved the way for PMC Wagner to launch an assault that would last nearly three months.

By late May, Artemovsk was captured by Russians. However, the hard-fought victory was overshadowed by a public confrontation between Prigozhin, the head of PMC Wagner, and the Russian military establishment. In June 2023, Prigozhin attempted a mutiny; as a result, the Wagner group was disbanded.

As early as January 2023, Ukrainian command resolved to hold onto “Fortress Bakhmut” at all costs, a decision that drew significant criticism later on. The resources spent on sustaining a garrison in a city of little strategic value, along with efforts to break the encirclement through counterattacks, could have been more effectively employed in the south of Ukraine during the key battles of summer 2023.

Motivated by success the previous fall, both Kiev and NATO now believed the AFU could inflict a decisive military defeat on Russia. The prevailing opinion was that the Russian army was “a colossus with feet of clay” and could be easily toppled by a strong, single blow.

The area north of the Azov Sea was chosen as the target for such a blow. The plan was to cut the so-called “land corridor” connecting mainland Russia with Crimea, which would force Putin to withdraw forces from southern Kherson and Zaporozhye regions – and potentially even from Crimea if the Kerch Bridge were damaged again. The open steppe was suitable for tank movement and the area was sparsely populated, so it seemed like a good plan.

The offensive was to be carried out by an “assault guard” – ten new brigades equipped with Western weapons. Current information suggests that the plan involved using two or three heavy brigades to breach Russian frontline defenses at two points. Following this, an additional one or two brigades would expand the breaches and allow high-mobility units to push through, followed by regular Ukrainian forces. To further weaken Russian defenses, airborne operations were also planned along the lower reaches of the Dnieper River.

If it were successful, the operation would have mirrored the Kharkov offensive: in just a few days, the Ukrainian army could have reached the Sea of Azov, forcing the Russians to flee. This would have only slightly expanded the front, and the area could have been effectively defended by leveraging the AFU’s overall numerical superiority. 

It’s worth noting that if carried out in the summer-fall of 2022, this plan would have had a solid chance of success. However, the Russian command was not caught off guard; it was prepared. The partial mobilisation in the fall had balanced the number of troops on the front lines, and since Ukraine and the West openly discussed their upcoming counteroffensive throughout the winter, Russia concentrated its fortification efforts in the southern sector.

Throughout the winter and spring, Russian civil and military construction organisations built a defensive line that was 150km long and up to 50km deep, which became known as the “Surovikin Line.” It helped the Russian General Staff carry out its strategic defensive operation.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive began on June 6 but quickly went awry. Just a day earlier, the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station dam collapsed. While the resulting wave washed away Russian fortifications on the southern bank of the Dnieper River, it also made it impossible for the Ukrainians to cross the river.

Ukrainian forces launched their assault in two directions: near Robotino and at the so-called Vremevsky bulge (south of Velikaya Novoselka). However, the attack faltered: the German-made tanks hit mines, while immobilised Ukrainian armored columns were attacked from the air and pre-established firing positions. Footage of burning German-made tanks, followed by numerous images of destroyed British and French tanks, became a ‘cold shower’ for Ukraine and its backers.

But the counteroffensive did not end there. The Robotino area and the former Vremevsky bulge soon became sites of intense fighting. With great persistence, Ukrainian forces pressed against Russian defenses, first with heavy breakthrough brigades and then with lighter units intended to exploit any breaches and quickly move toward the Sea of Azov.

However, in four and a half months of fighting, the AFU couldn’t breach the “Surovikin Line.” They barely managed to advance on two narrow fronts, just reaching the first of Russia’s three defensive positions. 

By October 2023, Ukraine’s offensive had completely stalled. Ukrainian leadership and Western media were forced to face the stark reality: the “counteroffensive” had failed, and the notion that Russia could be defeated on the battlefield now looked ridiculous.

October 2023 – February 2025: Russian assaults

In 2023-24, there was a true revolution in weaponry: the widespread use of FPV (First-Person View) drones became the new norm. These drones supplemented the DJI Mavic and Matrice commercial quadcopters already used for reconnaissance. For the first time in military history, nearly every soldier on the front line was aware of what was going on at tactical depth around the clock and had access to weapons with high-precision strike capabilities, which would be ready for action within minutes.

Like a revolver in the Wild West, drones leveled the playing field; a tank worth hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars could now be taken out by a device costing less than $1,000, operated from several miles away. Over two years, both sides saw a significant increase in drone usage –and it wasn’t just quantity (up to several thousand drones could be launched per day) but also their quality that increased. Drones with more payload capacity, night-flying drones equipped with thermal imaging, signal relay drones, mothership drones that transport lighter drones directly to the front lines, self-guided drones, and fiber-optic drones impervious to electronic warfare all became available at this time. 

In these circumstances, the Russian General Staff had to find effective ways to dismantle the enemy forces. The drone revolution, combined with NATO’s intelligence and communication capabilities, made it impossible to breach the front line at strategic depths, and limited operations to positional warfare rather than maneuver tactics. The Russian army made numerous assault attempts – a January-February 2023 assault on the strategically vital town of Ugledar by Russian forces, carried out according to Soviet military doctrine, had failed; likewise, an effort to breach Ukrainian defenses near Avdeevka on October 10-11, 2023 did not go as planned. This marked the beginning of the fourth phase of the conflict.

The siege of Avdeevka turned into a four-month ordeal, reminiscent of Bakhmut. The city was encircled on three sides, and Ukrainian supply lines came under Russia’s fire control. However, instead of a simultaneous frontal assault, the strategy focused on methodically wearing down the city’s garrison, minimising assaults in the urban area.

With no means to break through the front, in August 2024, Ukrainian forces launched an attack on Russia’s Kursk Region. This area had previously remained quiet: instead of a layered defense, the Russian side maintained light combat security along the border. The operation mirrored Ukraine’s 2022 Kharkov campaign: the AFU swiftly infiltrated the area using fast-moving vehicles, leveraging communication and reconnaissance advantages to quickly capture a large area and force Russian forces to chaotically retreat.

However, the advance in Kursk soon got bogged down. The only significant town captured by the AFU was Sudzha, while progress toward the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant halted within days.

By early September, the Russian army had managed to reduce Ukraine’s foothold near Sudzha by 60%. Following this, the situation no longer posed a strategic threat, and fighting transitioned into the phase of positional warfare. If the goal of the Ukrainian command was to compel Russia to divert its forces from Donbass, it had failed. Sudzha increasingly drained Ukraine’s already limited reserves in late 2024 and early 2025.

Meanwhile, in Donbass, the Russian army effectively replicated the tactics used in Avdeevka, carrying out many successful assaults throughout 2024. The approach was straightforward: to encircle cities, take supply lines under fire control, wear down the garrison, and capture the city with minimal combat. The Russians employed drone strikes, particularly using Lancet drones with a range of up to 80km, as well as high-precision guided bombs equipped with UPMK modules; during fierce battles, hundreds of such bombs were used per day.

In the first half of 2024, the Russian army captured just one city (Avdeevka), but in the second half of 2024, they took control of seven cities and about fifteen urban settlements. In September 2024, the second assault on Ugledar took place. The 2024 offensive campaign culminated in the Kurakhovo operation, the largest since the initial phase of the special military operation.

It’s important to note that these assaults on numerous cities and towns in the DPR were not the goal for the Russian army. Unable to decisively defeat the AFU in maneuver warfare, the Russian military adopted a strategy of “tactical opportunism.” Capitalising on their numerical superiority and firepower, coupled with complete air superiority, the Russians pressed the Ukrainian army along the entire thousand-kilometer-long front line, exploiting the situation to their advantage wherever Ukrainian defenses faltered. 

This strategy significantly depleted the Ukrainian army. According to Ukrainian sources, a typical frontline brigade is now at best half-staffed (compared to the well-staffed (85-90%) Russian brigades). The quality of Ukrainian soldiers is also visibly declining: the last major voluntary recruitment consisted of the so-called “assault brigades” formed in early 2023. Since then, most reinforcements have been assembled from forcibly mobilised people, and thousands of conscripts have deserted the front lines. Consequently, operational crises have increased, with undertrained brigades fleeing, leading to the abandonment of several towns and newly established defensive positions. The situation has only been made worse by the Kursk operation, where all fresh, well-prepared, and better-equipped Ukrainian reserves are deployed.

As of February 2025, we’re seeing an ‘operational pause’ at most sections of the front. Both sides are actively preparing for the spring-summer campaign. While we lack a complete picture, there’s a growing sense that the Ukrainian forces may be struggling to prepare for it adequately. So despite being worn down from combat, the Russian army has a real chance of achieving decisive success in the next six months to a year. This could lead to the collapse of Ukrainian defenses, and potentially to the collapse of the front for dozens or even hundreds of miles.

Of course, this campaign may never take place. Negotiations between Washington and Moscow are currently under way, which could ultimately determine Ukraine’s fate without a final battle.

This article was originally published in RT.